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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Brunet timely appeals from the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Brunet argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various
transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense. Mr. Brunet also argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and denied
his oral l.C.R. 35 motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Brunet was charged, by Information, with grand theft and forgery. (R., pp.4849.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Brunet pleaded guilty to grand theft and, in

return, the State agreed to dismiss the charge of forgery.

(R., pp.53-53, 57.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Brunet on probation. (R., pp.77-81.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging
that Mr. Brunet violated various terms of his probation.

(R., pp.97-99.)

Mr. Brunet

admitted to violating the terms of his probation by committing the crime of petit theft, by
failing to contact his probation officer about contact with law enforcement, and by failing
to make himself available for programming and supervision. (R., pp.97-99, 107.) The
district court then revoked probation and executed the sentence, but retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.110-113.) At the jurisdictional review hearing, Mr. Brunet made an
oral request that the district court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence pursuant to
l.C.R. 35.

(12/23/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-23.)

Upon review of Mr. Brunet's period of

retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court relinquished jurisdiction and
1

executed the underlying sentence.

(R., pp.117-119.)

Mr. Brunet timely appeals.

(R., pp.120-123.)
On appeal, Mr. Brunet's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with various transcripts and to suspend the briefing schedule pending the preparation of
those transcripts.

(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.)

The State

objected to Mr. Brunet's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
an order denying Mr. Brunet's request for the change of plea hearing, held on
November 12, 2010, and the sentencing hearing, held on December 23, 2010. (Order
Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order
Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Brunet due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brunet's oral l.C.R.
35 motion requesting leniency?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Brunet Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Brunet filed a Motion to Augment requesting a transcript of the
change of plea hearing held on November 12, 2010, and the sentencing hearing, held
on December 23, 2010, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to relinquish
jurisdiction, a district court can consider all of the prior hearings.

That motion was

denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Brunet is challenging the Idaho Supreme
Court's denial of his request for transcripts.

Mr. Brunet asserts that the requested

transcripts are relevant to the issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in
relinquishing jurisdiction and in denying his oral l.C.R. 35 motion because the district
court could rely on its memory of the prior hearings when it decided to relinquish
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Brunet Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The
Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Brunet With Access
To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because
He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the state of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO CONST.

art.1§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

Maresh v. State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
l.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
l.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

l.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
l.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
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"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." l.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits a state's obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review.
The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In
order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the
states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of
the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
6

themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as
follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,

422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Brunet fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Brunet's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether
the transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
10

to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
decision to relinquish jurisdiction.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
11

this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Brunet is challenging
not only the order relinquishing jurisdiction, but also the denial of his oral l.C.R. 35
motion, which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made
appropriate sentencing determinations.

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)). 1 The scope of review in this matter is
broadened because, and as stated above, Mr. Brunet is also challenging the district
court's denial of his l.C.R. 35 motion. See State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App.
1985) ("Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35 [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the

1

In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan opinion is not a final opinion
and Mr. Brunet is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
12

original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce.").
Further support for Mr. Brunet's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked.

Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of

Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id.

The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the original
sentencing hearing.

Id.

Even though the original sentence was not on appeal, and

happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the
transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was
no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation
hearing or that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the
probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed
that the original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense.
13

Had Mr. Brunet failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren opinion indicates
that it would be presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original
sentence by denying his oral l.C.R. 35 motion.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Brunet's request for the change of
plea hearing held on November 12, 2010, and the sentencing hearing, held on
December 23, 2010, will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed
that the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This

functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Brunet's appellate sentencing claims
on the merits, and therefore, Mr. Brunet should either be provided with the requested
transcripts or the presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Brunet With Access
To The Requested Transcripts Has Denied Him Due Process Because He
Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell:
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted
to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in
14

the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard."
Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Brunet has not obtained
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review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Brunet on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Brunet is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Brunet his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
16

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Mr. Brunet argues that under any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837

(Ct. App. 1992).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the
inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). Mr. Brunet does not contest whether the

district court appropriately perceived its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of
discretion.

Mr. Brunet argues that the district court did not exercise that discretion

based on the appropriate legal standards and that the district court failed to exercise
reason when relinquishing jurisdiction.
As a preliminary note, Mr. Brunet incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section 111, infra, herein by this reference.
While Mr. Brunet did not perform well on his rider, he told the district court at the
rider review hearing that at first he really did not think he needed any programming.
(12/23/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-10.) After he had made a bad name for himself on his rider, he
did realize that he needed to change his behavior. ( 12/23/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-15.) He
also stated that this was his first true rehabilitative program, which might be the reason
he was reticent to truly submit it the advice of the staff. (12/23/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-15.)
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Additionally, Mr. Brunet also learned that he had a substance addiction problem
while on

his rider.

Before,

sentencing Mr.

Brunet participated

in a Gain-I

Recommendation and Referral Summary, which concluded that he had no problems
with addiction and did not need any treatment. (PSI, p.43.) Mr. Brunet started his rider
thinking that he no problems with substance addiction and this belief was supported by
a substance abuse evaluation. (12/23/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.16-19; PSI, p.43.) Based on this
presumption, Mr. Brunet's thought that his program's emphasis on addiction was
misplaced. (12/23/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Brunet did come to accept the fact he
has addiction issues, but by that point in time he had been fighting the treatment
providers for so long he was already set up for a relinquishment recommendation.
(12/23/11 Tr., p.14, L.20 - p.16, L.1.) Therefore, Mr. Brunet's rider performance was
not an accurate litmus for his potential on probation because he did not think he needed
any of that treatment.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction
because Mr. Brunet had a legitimate reason to believe that he was erroneously placed
in a treatment program geared toward substance addiction.

111.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Brunet's l.C.R. 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency In light Of The IDOC's Inability To Coordinate His Mental Health
Treatment With His Programming
Mr. Brunet argues that the unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, is
unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter. A
motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under l.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
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251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested

leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Brunet does not allege that his

sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion, Mr. Brunet must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
As a preliminary note, Mr. Brunet incorporates the mitigating information
contained in Section 11, supra, herein by this reference.
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There were mitigating factors before the district court at the time of sentencing
which, when viewed in light of the new information, provide further support for the
conclusion that Mr. Brunet's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Brunet expressed
his remorse for the underlying offense and indicated that he was willing to pay
restitution. (PSI, p.3.) Also, Mr. Brunet was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at
the time he committed the underlying offense. (PSI, pp.2-3.)
Additionally, Mr. Brunet's difficult childhood is a mitigating factor. Mr. Brunet was
raised in poverty and met his biological parents when he was fifteen. (PSI, pp.6-7.) He
was living with his extended family when he was sent to meet and live with his mother.
(PSI, p.7.) His mother kicked him out of her home and, thereafter, Mr. Brunet has had
to struggle to survive. (PSI, p.7.) According to the district court "you have a childhood I
wouldn't wish on anybody." (12/23/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-17.)
Despite his setbacks Mr. Brunet has been able to provide for himself.

In fact,

Mr. Brunet was a co-owner in a company that sold cleaning products door-to-door.
(PSI, p.9.)
In sum, the mitigating factors in this matter support the conclusion that
Mr. Brunet's sentence is unduly harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Brunet

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Brunet respectfully requests that this
Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 161h day of August, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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